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SUMMARY
We propose a probabilistically based incentive payment system for guideline implementation that provides
rewards for physicians who follow practice guidelines and additional remuneration for physician leaders who
engage in information sharing. All payments are based on observed outcomes of patient treatment. A fixed base
payment forms the core of the system with probabilistic offsets calculated from the chance that a ‘good’ outcome
occurs without optimal treatment or information. The system pays different physician types for different task sets.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite some evidence that medical practice
guidelines have been ‘oversold’,1 they remain the
focus of intensive research and policy activity in
the United States and elsewhere.2,3 The Agency
for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR)
initially made guidelines development a central
priority because guidelines allow improvement of
both quality and cost effectiveness.4 Other coun-
tries, including Canada, the United Kingdom and
France, also are developing and implementing
practice guidelines in a variety of clinical areas.5–8
Two factors have contributed to growing interest
in guidelines in the United States despite the
movement of the AHCPR away from guideline
development. First, research focusing on patient
care outcomes offers extensive evidence of unex-
plained variation in the use of health care
resources.9,10 Several studies have found a high
proportion of inappropriate use of health serv-
ices.11 These variations may result from uncer-
tainty about how to optimally manage a given
health condition.12 Second, rapid increases in
health care expenditures have led payers and
providers to look for ways of ensuring more
appropriate and cost-effective medical care. Pro-
ponents contend that use of guidelines will reduce
unwanted variations in medical care, control
health care costs and improve quality.13–15 How-
ever, there is evidence that development and
dissemination of guidelines rarely lead directly to
changes in physician behaviour.16,17 In the
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absence of medical malpractice tort reform, the
threat of sanctions or the provision of economic
incentives there is reason to doubt that physicians
will implement guidelines.17 However, social
influence and opinion leaders may help change
physician behaviour.18,19
Payers have an active interest in implementing
guidelines that improve patient outcomes while
containing medical care costs. Outcomes may
include more easily measurable short-term results
of care such as mortality and morbidity rates or
less measurable longer term effects such as
functional and health status, quality of life and
patient satisfaction. Outcomes are most often
measured over all patients in a hospital or medical
group practice. However, it has been traditional
to use a process based payment to pay providers
of health care based on their treatment of patients
without regard to outcome.20,21 An intensive case
by case control system, utilization management
involves intervention in patient care activities for
the purpose of reducing costs. However, there is
evidence that long-term savings from utilization
management is uneven, especially when the cost
of the utilization management program is con-
sidered.22,23 Further, utilization management dis-
rupts the patient–physician relationship and
places an administrative burden on the
physician.24,25
One response to the problem of improving
quality while containing costs would be to
develop guidelines and pay directly for guideline
adherence. Two problems arise, however. First,
wooden adherence to guidelines may be contrain-
dicated in specific cases. Medical practice is as
much of an art as it is a science. Physician
judgment is to be valued and physicians rewarded
for practising the best medicine rather than
penalized for it. As important, it would be difficult
if not impossible to monitor each physician’s
adherence to guidelines. The second problem is
referred to in the literature as the case of
unobservable action by the agent.26 In such cases,
rather than mandate guideline adherence
research suggests that it may be preferable to pay
for overall outcomes, allowing providers freedom
to deal with clinical care decisions for individual
patients. In this way, if a treatment is inap-
propriate for a specific patient the physician can
elect not to use it in that case, while overall
adherence to the guidelines contributes to the
most cost-effective production of health out-
comes. The assessment of guidelines use is then
based on both appropriateness and effectiveness
of care, where appropriateness is the correct
groups or individuals receiving care and effective-
ness the goodness of outcome of care.27
Under current managed care networks and
employer group purchasing, health care providers
that have poor patient outcomes suffer economic
loss. Accordingly, medical practice guidelines may
advance a health plan’s or health care provider’s
well being and improve chances for survival in a
competitive era. However, while payers and
administrators view guidelines as important, prac-
titioners and patients may see their use as a threat
to autonomy and a substitute for sound clinical
judgment.19 This perception makes guideline
adoption difficult. Recognition of the importance
of guideline implementation thus induces interest
about incentives that encourage physicians to
adopt and implement guidelines. Increased physi-
cian involvement is one component of improved
guideline implementation.28
Guidelines have also taken a central role in
countries outside of the United States where
managed care and competition are less promi-
nent. In France, the National Agency for the
Development of Medical Evaluation (ANDEM)
has introduced National Medical Guidelines for a
wide variety of medical diagnoses and treatments.
This system includes overall incentive payments
(fee increases and fines) to improve compliance.5
The United Kingdom and Italy have also intro-
duced practice guidelines into systems of national
health reform.6,7
Recently, promotion of guidelines largely
appears to have been taken over by evidence-
based medicine advocates. Little attention has
focused on the use of incentives to encourage
guideline implementation. For a given clinical
condition a health provider produces the lowest
possible level of adverse outcomes at the lowest
cost when physicians implement correctly devel-
oped guidelines. (There has also been insufficient
attention given to the cost effectiveness of guide-
lines. This paper focuses implementation of guide-
lines that are cost effective. Other important
research would consider the cost effectiveness
issue.) In practice, providers have encountered
obstacles in encouraging physicians to behave in
this manner. Accordingly, we propose that health
plans employ an incentive system for guideline
implementation that rewards physicians who fol-
low practice guidelines and who engage in guide-
line-related information sharing activity. This
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paper advances such a system using principal–
agent theory. The question of physician agency is
a difficult one. Pauly and Redisch29 conclude that
the hospital is a physician cooperative: the hospi-
tal serves as an agent for the medical staff.
However, contrary views exist.30 Ellis and
McGuire31 developed a pioneering model of a
physician as agent for two principals: the hospital
and the patient. However, these views predate
changes in health care financing that shift risk of
loss from payers to providers while drastically
reducing patient choice. In the evolving setting,
the health plan, group practice or hospital has
become a residual claimant: a principal (or
substitute principal for the patient), economically
responsible for the patient’s medical care. The
physician is often an agent for the hospital or for




Recent research has demonstrated a link between
economic incentives and physician behaviour.33
Much of the payment research has focused on
cost and utilization of hospital services.34,35 Other
work has attempted to identify incentives that
lead physicians to engage in specific practice
patterns.36 Some payment studies ask how to
design payment systems that lead to ‘appropriate’
amounts or types of care: whether payment
systems can improve the quality of patient
care37,38 and the balance between professional
ethics and financial incentives.39,40 Hillman com-
ments, ‘whereas most physicians will act in the
patient’s best interest when the medical decision
is clear-cut, the effect of financial incentives may
be most important in cases where the correct
decision is not obvious’.39 In a later paper,
Hillman41 compares the alternative use of rules
(including practice guidelines) and incentives in
inducing appropriate behaviour under conditions
involving medical uncertainty. Incentives provide
indirect economic influences on clinical decisions.
Hillman claims that managed care systems need
to balance the use of rules and incentives.
However, rules and incentives are not an ‘either
or’ proposition. Indeed, ‘rules’ implicitly include
sanctions. Sanctions are nothing other than neg-
ative incentives, while rewards are positive incen-
tives. Psychological research has emphasized that
positive incentives are far more powerful than are
negative ones (Ref. 42, p. 167). Our work carries
forward Hillman’s ideas by proposing that incen-
tives can be used to provide economic influence
that leads physicians to follow rules, but allows for
physician autonomy in individual cases. Con-
ceptually, incentives can induce physicians to
implement guidelines. As Hillman observed,
incentives thus serve as an important link
between sound medical judgment and guideline
implementation, particularly under conditions of
uncertainty. We propose a probabilistically
designed incentive system to encourage physician
adherence to practice guidelines.
ASSUMPTIONS
A. We develop our model in the context of a
provider’s efforts to implement a guideline.
The goal is to induce all physicians practis-
ing under the ‘sponsorship’ of the provider
to adhere to the practice guideline. We
assume that the provider either accounts for
the wages of the physicians or, by granting
the physician staff privileges, makes it possi-
ble for the physician to earn his or her
income. We further assume that the guide-
lines are professionally developed: To the
extent possible they incorporate practices
that produce optimal outcomes in the most
cost effective manner. Thus, they serve as a
signal to physicians of the best process for
accomplishing desired outcomes.
B. The provider cannot observe directly the
treatment actions taken by physicians
(direct observation is expensive and con-
stitutes overly intrusive ‘micro-manage-
ment’ of patient care). Physicians can
observe, but cannot verify the actions of
other physicians. Active teaching by physi-
cian leaders and their actions influence the
behaviour of other physicians. The provider
can observe (without error) outcomes over
the set of the provider’s patients. (While this
is not true in every case, and may never be
true for some more complicated medical
practices, some outcomes can be measured
and researchers are making progress in the
area of outcomes measurement. See the
section on practice implications for a further
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discussion of issues surrounding outcomes
measurement.) For example, the provider
knows length of stay, ancillary service use,
morbidity, mortality and hospital readmis-
sion rate. The provider also knows with
certainty which physician treated each
patient. The provider can adjust expecta-
tions for patient characteristics that might
affect outcome. In other words, the provider
knows the patient diagnosis, severity and
demographic characteristics and can adjust
outcome expectation accordingly.
C. The actions of the physicians are correlated,
but not symmetrically so. If a physician
‘leader’ takes certain actions, other physi-
cians will have an increased probability of
also taking those actions.43 If the leader
actively disseminates information about her
or his actions, the probability of other
physicians taking similar actions becomes
even higher. We assume that optimal out-
comes result from active ‘buy-in’ and prose-
lytizing of other physicians by leaders. If a
physician who is not a leader exhibits
actions or disseminates information, their
conduct will not change the behaviour of
other physicians. Leaders are those physi-
cians who are generally considered ‘opinion
leaders’ in the medical and quality improve-
ment literature, typically physicians with
good reputations, high-level academic train-
ing and charismatic personalities.44 In the
basic model, the leader type is known to
both the health plan and the other physi-
cians. Extensions of the model include the
possibility of error in type identification.
D. The guidelines have been adopted in a cost
effective manner and the cost of the incen-
tive payment system does not exceed the
benefit produced by guideline adherence.
DESIGNING THE INCENTIVES
The incentive system pays physicians based on
observed patient outcomes. It pays (or sanctions)
leaders an additional amount for making public
their advocacy of adherence to the guidelines. The
payment system has two components: the first is
an outcome based payment that varies over
patient outcome and physician ‘type’. ‘Type’ is a
multiplier of the outcome payment, with physi-
cians of higher type receiving greater payment for
the same outcomes. (Leaders are the highest type.
Type is determined from seniority, referral prac-
tice, amount of specialty training and other
similar factors. Payment based on type allows
recruitment of better physicians and permits
compensation for differences in risk among physi-
cian caseloads.) We omit the type multipliers from
the model for clarity of notation. The second
payment component is a cooperation-based pay-
ment to encourage the exchange of information.
Because the provider cannot perfectly observe
the exchange of information among physicians, it
will pay based on outcomes and type. In addition
to their treatment actions, the provider pays
leaders for informing activity or teaching.
While we refer throughout to the ‘provider’ and
the ‘physician’, this model generalizes to other
settings (the principal could be a multi-specialty
group practice). We selected this setting because
providers financially at risk for care of a popula-
tion of patients are more likely to implement the
system than are others (others might include third
party insurance payers or the government).
We define the utility of the provider in terms of
money. Given a set of outcomes O = {O1, O2, O3,
..., Oi}, we assume that there exists a function f
that maps patient outcomes into money for the
health plan such that [O2] > [O1] ⇒ f[O2] >
f[O1] where [O2] > [O1] is the notation for
production of better outcome. If a physician
chooses action a, from a set of actions A = {a1, a2,
a3, ..., aN}, outcome Om will be produced with
non-zero probability πnm and with associated non-
wage cost to the health plan of Cn [the cost is
dependent only on the action, not the outcome].
Let ω[Om] be the wage paid to the physician for
outcome Om. Then, let xnm = ω [Om]. We then
define a utility function u[f[Om], xnm, Cn]. We
assume that u[•] exhibits the characteristics of
traditional utility functions (it is strictly increas-
ing, continuous and twice differentiable). The





πnmu[f[Om], xnm, Cn] (1)
This function represents utility gained for a
probabilistic set of outcomes over the range of
selected physician actions. Where u is concave, the
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associated maximization problem will be a well
behaved mathematical programming problem.
The utility function for physicians depends on
their wages and on the disutility of action. Let any
treatment action taken by a non-leader physician
be represented by ai and any treatment action
taken by a leader represented as aL both chosen
from {a1, ..., aN}. The level of effort used by
leaders for informing is represented as k, chosen
from {k1, ..., kN}. The action taken by a leader is
independent of actions taken by other physicians,
while the action taken by non-leaders is depend-
ent on k. The wage of a non-leader is dependent
only on outcome and type. The wage of a leader
also depends on the outcomes of all other
physicians in the health plan. The total wages paid
to physicians by the health plan will be ω = ωi +
ωL. (The payment is more specifically ω =
ωi[πim[ai[k]]] + ωL[πLm[aL]; πim[ai[k]]]. The pay-
ment to the non-leader physician depends only on
their adherence to the guidelines while payment
to the leaders depends both on adherence to
guidelines and the adherence by other physicians
which is a function of the leaders’ informing
actions.)
The utility function for a non-leader physician
will be
u[pi] = ωi – d[ai[k]] (2)
where d[ai[k]] is the disutility of adhering to the
guideline. The utility for a leader is
u[pL] = ωL –d[aL] – δ[k] (3)
where δ[k] is the disutility of informing. There are
two constraints for each physician type. The first is
the participation constraint, also known as the
individual rationality constraint [IR]. The second
is the incentive compatibility constraint [IC].
Setting reservation utilities to zero, the linear













ωi[πim; ai[k]] – d[ai[k]] (5)
where a* is adhering perfectly to the guideline
and a is any other action.




ωL[πim[a*L]; πim; ai*[k]] –




ωL[πLm[a*l]; πim; ai[k*]] –












ai[k*]] – d[aL] – δ[k*] (7)
where k* is optimum use of informing to convert
other physicians to the action of the leader and k
is any other amount of informing. (Because
informing by leaders produces more of the type of
activity in which the leaders are engaged, optimal
informing by physicians who are not adhering to
guidelines results in worse outcomes than non-
optimal informing. Maximum utility occurs when
leaders adhering to guidelines inform optimally,
followed by the situation where leaders adhere to
the guidelines and inform suboptimally, then the
case where leaders do not adhere to the guide-
lines but inform suboptimally. The least utility
occurs where the leaders do not adhere to the
guidelines but inform about this action.) The
leader’s IC constraint states that the wages
received will conform to the hierarchy: (1) wages
received by adhering perfectly to the guidelines
and expending optimal energy informing will
exceed (2) wages received when adhering per-
fectly to the guideline but expending any other
effort in informing will exceed (3) wages received
for taking non-guideline actions and less than
optimal informing and will exceed (4) wages
received for taking less than optimal actions and
informing about these actions. One must exceed
two which must exceed three which must exceed
four. The leaders’ wages are jointly dependent on
two actions: adhering to the guidelines and
informing.
We want to maximize expected income to the
health plan, Σπn*mu[f[Om], xn*m, Cn] (where Σ is
summed over n) subject to the constraints above
(n* is optimal adherence to the guideline and
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optimal informing action on the part of all
physicians in the health plan). Because we are
maximizing a concave utility function in money,
subject to linear inequality constraint functions,
we invoke the Kuhn–Tucker conditions. These
conditions will be necessary and sufficient for a
local maximization of the objective function,
given that the objective function is concave and
the constraint functions are convex.45
Before proceeding, we rewrite the objective
function and constraints substituting x for the
wage and for probability multipliers. The health




πkn*mu[f[Om], xnm, Cn] (8)
whereπknm are the probabilities of overall health
plan outcomes m that result from the actions n of
all physicians in the presence of the information
disseminated by the leaders k (πkn*m is the
probability of non-leader physicians adhering to
the guideline in the presence of whatever amount
of information dissemination is performed by the
leaders). While the actions of the non-leaders are
dependent on k, the actions of the leaders are not
dependent on the actions of the non-leaders. It
may also occur with non-zero probability that
non-leaders adhere to the guidelines without
information from leaders. This probability is
always less than the probability of action a*i in the













πknm[xknm] – d[an]) ≥ 0 (10)




[πk*nmπkn*m]xkn*m – d[a*L] –
















[πk*nmπknm]xknm – d[aL] –
δ[k*] (12)
For a unique solution, all constraints must bind.
The final payment scheme should be separable: it
should consist of payments to non-leaders and to
leaders. Different agents of different types will
receive payment for different task sets. The
provider pays non-leader types for their treat-
ment actions after measuring outcomes. The
provider pays leaders for both their treatment
actions and their leadership actions. The provider
infers both from outcomes. The Lagrangian after
application of Kuhn–Tucker is set forth in the
Appendix. This equation may be simplified to the
final payment scheme expression (omitting the
symbol for the summation of each right-hand
term from n = 1 to N):
u'[•] = [λ1 + λ2] – λ2[πknm /πkn*m] + [λ3 +
λ4]πk*nm – λ5πknm – λ6[πknm πknm] / [πkn*m]
– λ7[πkn*m πknm] / [πkn*m] (13)
There is only a single payment based on out-
comes, a portion of which is paid to the non-
leader physicians and another portion of which
paid to the leaders. The payment is calculated
based on probabilities of outcomes occurring
given certain actions (guideline adherence). The
portion paid to non-leaders is a fixed sum [λ1 +
λ2]. This amount is adjusted to account for the
probability that the desired outcome may have
occurred ‘spontaneously’ without adherence to
guidelines, λ2[πknm/πkn*m]. This adjustment
assumes that these results occur either in patients
for whom treatment was not necessary or through
treatment plans that were less efficient in produc-
ing desired outcomes than the plan recommended
by the guideline. Payment to leader physicians
consists of a base amount based on outcomes
premised on the probability that the outcome
occurred as a result of activity by the leaders, [[λ3
+ λ4]πk*nm]. The provider adjusts the base pay-
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ment amount downward for three ‘spontaneous’
occurrences: (i) the probability that a good
outcome occurred when the leader followed the
guideline but failed to expend optimal energy in
informing other physicians, λ5πknm; (ii) a good
outcome, but the leader physicians neither fol-
lowed the guideline nor informed other physi-
cians, λ6[πknmπknm]/[πkn*m]; and (iii) good out-
comes occurred while the leader was not
following the guideline but was informing the
other physicians, λ7[πkn*m πknm]/[πkn*m]. The
probability of a good outcome under each succes-
sive undesirable occurrence is successively
smaller as are the offsets for λ5, λ6 and λ7.
SOME PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Application of principal agent theory in the
context of incentives for guideline implementa-
tion suggests that optimal guideline adherence
will result from an incentive system based on
outcomes. Applying the theory in clinical practice
requires careful consideration of a number of
practical issues.
First, because the actions of the agent (the
physician) cannot be observed, principal agent
theory suggests a way to obtain an optimal (best
possible) outcome rather than a perfect one. A
perfect solution would require perfect observ-
ability for the agent.
Second, the model assumes that the cost of
action (cn) is observable. In practice, costs might
not be fully observable. The model deals with this
difficulty. The costs of complying with guidelines
accrue to the physicians. They include both
measurable costs (time, technology risk and so
forth) and non-measurable costs (satisfaction).
While these costs are not known to others they
are known to the physician. The incentive system
optimizes physician adherence to the guidelines
and physician leader informing based on their
perception of their own costs. The system also
provides an incentive for the physician to learn as
much as possible about the cost of action, perhaps
an improvement over current practice. Thus, while
costs might not be fully or perfectly observable,
the payment system should still produce an
optimal (albeit not perfect) result.
Third, social theory suggest that individuals
may actually devalue some activity for which
there is payment. Thus, volunteers who receive no
payment for their efforts may place more value on
their activities than if they were paid.46 There is
the danger that payment to physician leaders for
guideline adherence may diminish their status as
leaders. Still, in US hospitals there is a tradition of
payment for physician leaders (chiefs of staff,
department heads and others). There is little
evidence that the payment system diminishes
their stature as leaders, although there are proba-
bly situations where paid physician leaders are
perceived to have been coopted by manage-
ment.47 Alternatively, payment to physician lead-
ers for guideline adherence may serve as an
additional signal by the payer of the importance
of guideline use.
Fourth, the model presumes that outcomes can
be defined, observed and measured. This poses
perhaps the greatest practical implementation
difficulty. While the difficulty in correctly measur-
ing outcomes has been discussed, many physicians
and researchers are committed to outcomes based
guideline development and implementa-
tion.27,48,49 Philosophically, the medical care sys-
tem presumes that medical intervention is effec-
tive and that it will therefore produce a beneficial
outcome. Increased cost consciousness has pro-
duced renewed effort toward evaluating the
effectiveness of medical interventions.1 On one
level, if an intervention cannot produce an
observable beneficial outcome, the system should
not pay for it (or should reduce the amounts paid
based on uncertainty). Moreover, there is exten-
sive research by government and industry regard-
ing outcome definition and measurement. The
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research has
funded several large pilot outcome research
projects addressing these issues.50 Employers and
employer funded groups have begun to measure
employee health status and to track the effective-
ness of managed care organizations over time in
maintaining and improving health.51 Our model
assumes that outcomes can be defined, observed
and measured. It is important to note that our
model may only be applicable to certain guide-
lines initially. One example might be an initial
evaluation of guidelines for antibiotics used based
on short term clinical and financial outcomes
including rates of adverse drug events, patterns of
antimicrobial resistance, mortality, length of hos-
pital stay, yearly expenditures for antibiotics and
daily doses per 100 occupied bed days.52 Future
guidelines and incentive systems might incorpo-
rate broader outcomes including patient quality
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of life and satisfaction in the longer term.53
During the period that outcomes measurement is
being refined and improved, it is important to
note that our model may be of use only in
situations where appropriate intermediate out-
comes can be measured. In certain clinical situa-
tions, it may not be possible to use outcome based
incentives. This would be the case where out-
comes are too difficult or expensive to measure or
in cases, such as therapy for HIV/AIDS or some
types of cancer, where technology is changing so
rapidly that long term outcomes have no rele-
vance to actual clinical practice by the time those
outcomes can be measured and made available.
However, we do believe that guideline develop-
ment should be outcome based27 and that guide-
line implementation will be aided by the measure-
ment of outcomes and incentives for producing
desirable outcomes. We anticipate the expansion
of measurable outcomes from such short-term
measures as mortality, readmission rate and
length of stay to more complete outcomes includ-
ing health and functional status, quality of life and
patient satisfaction. This has not yet come about
and we do not intend to give short shrift to a more
ambitious task than ours, only to note that if
outcome measures become available the current
model suggests one way to induce optimal physi-
cian effort.
Fifth, the model does not comment on the
manner of guideline development. Payment to
physicians and leaders suggests, perhaps, that they
be excluded from guideline development (on
conflict of interest grounds) lest they ‘water down’
guidelines to the point that the bonuses are easily
achieved without any real effort. However, physi-
cians currently make decisions concerning medi-
cal necessity for treatment and receive payment
for these decisions. Moreover, participation of
physicians and leaders in guideline development
will enhance their acceptance.54 The real test of
guideline effectiveness may be improved out-
comes. Accordingly, conflicts can be reduced if
outcomes are defined and tracked by a group that
does not include the treating physicians or physi-
cian leaders.
Sixth, the model results suggest merely that
optimal action will be induced by payment based
on outcomes. The model does not specify how
outcomes will be defined and measured. There are
a host of practical considerations that must be
addressed if the payment systems is to be effec-
tive. For example, to minimize the possibility of
physicians gaming the system, outcomes on which
payments are based will need to be adjusted for
individual physicians’ patient case mix. If either
case mix adjustment or initial outcomes measure-
ment lead to incorrect assessment of outcomes,
physicians could gain by treating only those
patients who are likely to respond regardless of
treatment (assuming that the physician can select
patients) or may be incented by the incorrectly
measured outcomes to provided inappropriate
treatment. The model does deal with the potential
for ‘spontaneous’ improvements. Good guidelines
presuppose that their application will produce
something more than spontaneous improvement.
Second, the model provides an offset for the
probability that a good outcome occurs in settings
where there is less than optimal effort by either
the non-leader or the leader physicians including
those efforts that may be optimal in the sense of
providing desired health outcomes, but less than
ideal when cost-effectiveness is considered.
Finally, there is an overall practical constraint
or qualification that is not formalized in the
model. The payment to the physician for the
outcome cannot exceed the net benefit produced
by the outcome, including the costs of measuring
the outcomes. While this is, perhaps, obvious in a
market-based system of health care, in a regulated
environment or a managed care arena this prem-
ise might be lost.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
If medical practice guidelines are to play a role in
improving outcomes and reducing costs, physi-
cians must implement them. Physicians’ intrinsic
rewards for implementing guidelines may not be
effective in altering behaviour. Moreover, it will
not be practical to adopt extensive monitoring to
ensure that they are adhering to them and good
implementation should encourage discretion to
deviate from the guidelines in special circum-
stances (where deviation will enhance outcomes).
Weingarten and Ellrodt55 showed that concurrent
teaching by physicians who are respected by their
peers and who are comfortable offering unsolic-
ited advice encourages guideline adoption. Our
model underscores these findings and suggests
that an economic incentive scheme that encour-
ages physician leaders to offer opinions and to
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deviate from guideline adherence where this
produces a more optimal result.
This paper shows that it is possible to design an
incentive system that encourages individual
adherence to guidelines by all physicians as well
as teaching on the part of opinion leaders.
However, there are issues that remain to be
addressed before implementing such a system will
be fully practical. Current research includes the
careful study of the linkages between guidelines
and outcomes.56 Additional understanding will
allow better assignment of probabilities to out-
comes. Further, it may not be possible to recog-
nize physician type accurately. Further work
might profitably extend this model to include
errors over identification of type.
We have used a principal–agent mechanism
with the provider acting as principal to protect its
own financial interests. It may be appropriate to
modify the model for a single payer to deal with
the eventuality of a single payer system for health
care payment. This would require the ability to
monitor outcomes and understand the spread of
information through a more complex network of
physician relationships. While more challenging,
such a model should prove tractable. As interest
in implementing guidelines continues to increase,
mechanism design approaches may prove useful
in conjunction with efforts to change reimburse-
ment, encourage education and remove organiza-
tional disincentives.
APPENDIX. SOLUTION FOR OBJECTIVE
FUNCTION AND CONSTRAINTS
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[πk*nmπkn*m]xkn*m – d[a*L] – δ[k*]} +
λ5[0 – { Σ
N
n=1
[πknmπkn*m]xkn*m – d[a*L] –








d[aL] – δ[k*]} (A1)
Taking the derivative with respect to payment,
leaving out the summation signs for convenience




= πkn*mu'[•] – λ1πkn*m – λ2πkn*m +
λ2πknm – λ3πk*nmπkn*m – λ4πk*nmπkn*m +
λ5πknmπkn*m + λ6πknmπknm +
λ7πk*nmπknm = 0 (A2)
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